ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

Secured Scheme for Data Reporting in Wireless Sensor Networks under Dynamic En-Route Environment

[1]N. Priya, [2]S. Sri Gowtham

[1,2]Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Bharath University, Chennai, India

ABSTRACT*:* Security has become one of the major issues for Data Communication over wired and wireless networks. In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), the hackers can inject false data via compromised nodes and can able to alter the original files. There are many chances to perform a Denial Of Service (DOS) attack in WSNs. Initially send the Dynamic Key to all the cluster nodes followed by neighboring nodes. Then send the file which will be hidden and is secured by encrypting using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm thereby mitigating from the DOS attack and Sybil attack. AES is secure enough to protect classified information up to the top Secret level, which is highest security. In a Sybil attacks, a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, Distinct nodes in the system. If a compromised is made while file being sent, then the algorithm finds the affected node and informs to the user that DOS attack is done.

I. INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks consist of a large number of small sensor nodes having limited computation capacity, restricted memory space, limited power resource, and short-range radio communication device. In military applications, sensor nodes may be deployed in hostile environments such as battlefields to monitor the activities of enemy forces. In these scenarios, sensor networks may suffer different types of malicious attacks. One type is called *false report injection attacks* [24], in which adversaries inject into sensor networks the false data reports containing nonexistent events or faked readings from compromised nodes. These attacks not only cause false alarms at the base station, but also drain out the limited energy of forwarding nodes. Also, the adversaries may launch DoS attacks against legitimate reports. In *selective forwarding attacks* [15], they may selectively drop legitimate reports, while in *report disruption attacks* [19], they can intentionally contaminate the authentication information of legitimate reports to make them filtered out by other nodes. Therefore, it is very important to design a dynamic quarantine scheme to filter these attacks or at least mitigate their impact on wireless sensor networks.

Recently, several schemes such as SEF [20], IHA [24], CCEF [18], LBRS [19], and LEDS [15] have been proposed to address false report injection attacks and/or DoS attacks. However, they all have some limitations. SEF is independent of network topology, but it has limited filtering capacity and cannot prevent impersonating attacks on legitimate nodes. IHA has a drawback, that is, it must periodically establish multihop pairwise keys between nodes. Moreover, it asks for a fixed path between the base station and each cluster-head to transmit messages in both directions, which cannot be guaranteed due to the dynamic topology of sensor networks or due to the use of some underlying routing protocol such as GPSR [7]. CCEF also relies on the fixed paths as IHA does and it is even built on top of expensive public-key operations. More severely, it does not support en-route filtering. LBRS and LEDS utilize location-based keys to filter false reports. They both assume that sensor nodes can determine their locations in a short period of time. However, this is not practical, because many localization approaches [2], [5], [11] take quite long and are also vulnerable to malicious attacks [3], [8], [9]. In LBRS, *report disruption attacks* are simply discussed, but no concrete solution is proposed. LEDS tries to address *selective forwarding attacks* by allowing a whole cell of nodes to forward one report, however, this incurs high communication overhead.

Dynamic en-route filtering scheme to address both false report injection attacks and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. The sensor nodes are organized into clusters. Each legitimate report should be validated by multiple message

ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

authentication codes (MACs), which are produced by sensing nodes using their own authentication keys. The authentication keys of each node are created from a hash chain. Before sending reports, nodes disseminate their keys to forwarding nodes using *Hill Climbing* approach. Then, they send reports in rounds. In each round, every sensing node endorses its reports using a new key and then discloses the key to forwarding nodes. Using the disseminated and disclosed keys, the forwarding nodes can validate the reports. In our scheme, each node can monitor its neighbors by overhearing their broadcast, which prevents the compromised nodes from changing the reports. Report forwarding and key disclosure are repeatedly executed by each forwarding node at every hop, until the reports are dropped or delivered to the base station.

Advantages

• We design the *Hill Climbing* approach for key dissemination, which ensures that the nodes closer to clusters hold more authentication keys than those closer to the base station do. This approach not only balances memory requirement among nodes, but also makes false reports dropped as early as possible.

• Multipath routing is adopted when disseminating keys to forwarding nodes, which not only reduces the cost for updating keys in highly dynamic sensor networks, but also mitigates the impact of selective forwarding attacks.

II. RELATED WORK

System Model:

The communication region of wireless sensor nodes as a circle area of radius, which is called the *transmission range*. We only consider the bidirectional links between neighbor nodes and assume that sensor nodes simply discard or ignore those links that are not bidirectional. Based on these assumptions, we say that two nodes must be the neighbor of each other and can always communicate with each other if the distance between them is no more than . Wireless sensor nodes may be deployed into some target field to detect the events occurring within the field. For example, in a military application, they may be deployed to a battlefield to detect the activities of enemy forces.We assume that sensor nodes form a number of clusters after deployment, each containing at least nodes. In each cluster, one node is randomly selected as the *cluster-head*. To balance energy consumption, all nodes within a cluster take turns to serve as the cluster-head. That means physically there is no difference between a cluster-head and a normal node because the cluster-head performs the same sensing job as the normal node. Given that some event occurs, e.g., tank movement, we assume that at least nodes can detect it simultaneously, where is a predefined system parameter. These nodes detecting the event are called *sensing nodes*. They generate and broadcast the *sensing reports* to the cluster-head. The cluster-head is responsible for aggregating these sensing reports into the *aggregated reports* and forwarding these aggregated reports to the *base station* through some forwarding nodes. Fig. 1 illustrates the organization of sensing nodes in wireless sensor networks. In the figure, and denote *Cluster- Head* and *Base Station* respectively. are forwarding nodes, and are sensing nodes. The black dots represent the compromised nodes, which are located either in the clusters or en-route.



Figure 1 Cluster Formation

ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

It regard data reporting as a task performed at the application layer and ignore the impact of link quality on report delivery. We assume that the protocols at some low layers such as routing layer or MAC layer can handle the failures or collisions in wireless communication by utilizing the mechanisms of acknowledgement and retransmission. We assume that the topologies of wireless sensor networks change frequently either because sensor nodes are prone to failures or because they need to switch their states between Active and Sleeping for saving energy. Thus, two messages generated by the same cluster may be delivered along different paths to the base station. Moreover, we assume the messages transmitted from a cluster-head to the base station and those from the base station to the cluster-head do not necessarily follow the same path because the underlying routing protocols such as GPSR [7], GEAR [21], or Rumor [1] cannot guarantee this.

Threat Model

Typically, sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant and can be compromised by adversaries. We assume that each cluster contains at most compromised nodes, which may collaborate with each other to generate false reports by sharing their secret key information. In this paper, we consider the following attacks launched by adversaries from the compromised nodes:

False Report Injection Attacks

The compromised nodes can send the false reports containing some forged or nonexistent events "occurring" in their clusters. Moreover, given sufficient secret information, they may even impersonate some uncompromised nodes of other clusters and report the forged events "occurring" within those clusters. These false reports not only cause false alarm at the base station, but also drain out the limited energy of forwarding nodes.

Dos Attacks

The compromised nodes can prevent the legitimate reports from being delivered to the base station, by either selectively dropping some reports, (which are called the *selective forwarding attacks* [15]) or intentionally inserting invalid authentication information into the reports to make them filtered by other forwarding nodes (which are called the *report disruption attacks* [19]).

III. PROPOSED SOLUTION

When an event occurs within some cluster, the cluster-head collects the *sensing reports* from sensing nodes and aggregates them into the *aggregated reports[1]*. Then, it forwards the aggregated reports to the base station through forwarding nodes. In our scheme, each sensing report contains one MAC that is produced by a sensing node using its authentication key (called *auth-key* for short), while each aggregated report contains distinct MACs, where is the maximum number of compromised nodes allowed in each cluster. Each node possesses a sequence of auth-keys that form a hash chain.[2] Before sending the reports, the cluster-head disseminates the first auth-keys of all nodes to the forwarding nodes that are located on multiple paths from the cluster-head to the base station. The reports are organized into rounds, each containing a fixed number of reports. In every round, each sensing node chooses a new auth-key to authenticate its reports.[3] To facilitate verification of the forwarding nodes, the sensing nodes disclose their auth-keys at the end of each round. Meanwhile, to prevent the forwarding nodes from abusing the disclosed keys, a forwarding node can receive the disclosed auth-keys, only after its upstream node overhears that it has already broadcast the reports.[4] Receiving the disclosed keys, each forwarding node verifies the reports, and informs its next-hop node to forward or drop the reports based on the verification result. If the reports are valid, it discloses the keys to its next-hop node after overhearing. The processes of verification, overhearing, and key disclosure are repeated by the forwarding nodes at every hop until the reports are dropped or delivered to the base station.[5]

Specifically, our scheme can be divided into three phases: *key predistribution phase*, *key dissemination phase*, and *report forwarding phase*. In the *key predistribution phase*, each node is preloaded with a distinct seed key from which it can

ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

generate a hash chain of its auth-keys. In the *key dissemination phase*, the cluster-head disseminates each node's first auth-key to the forwarding nodes, which will be able to filter false reports later. In the *report forwarding phase*, each forwarding node verifies the reports using the disclosed auth-keys and disseminated ones.[6] If the reports are valid, the forwarding node discloses the auth-keys to its next hop node after overhearing that node's broadcast.



Figure 2 Sample Block Diagram

Fig. 2 demonstrates the relationship between the three phases of our scheme.[7] *Key predistribution* is performed before the nodes are deployed, e.g., it can be done offline. *Key dissemination* happens before the sensing nodes begin to send the reports. It may be executed periodically depending on how often the topology is changed. Every time the latest (unused) auth-key of sensing nodes will be disseminated.[8] *Report forwarding* occurs at each forwarding node in every round

.

Key Predistribution Phase

Key predistribution needs to be performed only once. It consists of two steps.Each node is preloaded with a distinct seed key. From the seed key, it can generate a sequence of auth-keys using a common hash function. Thus, each node's auth keys form a hash chain. Let denote the length of hash chain. [9]

Key Dissemination Phase

In key dissemination phase the cluster-head discloses the sensing nodes' auth-keys after sending the reports of each round.[10] However, it is vulnerable to such an attack that a malicious node can pretend to be a cluster-head and inject arbitrary reports followed by falsified auth-keys. To prevent this attack, we enforce *key dissemination*, that is, the cluster-head should disseminate the *first* auth-keys of all nodes to the forwarding nodes before sending the reports in the first round.[11] By using the disseminated keys, the forwarding nodes can verify the authenticity of the disclosed auth-keys, which are in turn used to check the validity and integrity of the reports[12]. Key dissemination should be performed periodically in case that some forwarding nodes aware of the disseminated keys become failed, especially when the network topology is highly dynamic. In this case (of redissemination), the *first unused*, instead of the *first*, auth-keys will be

ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

disseminated. The first unused auth-key of a node is called the *current auth-key* of that node. When none of a node's auth-keys has ever been used, the current auth-key is just the first auth-key of its hash chain[13].

Hill Climbing

Hill Climbing technique introduces two important observations. First, when multiple clusters disseminate keys at the same time, some forwarding nodes need to store the auth-keys of different clusters. *The nodes closer to the base station need to store more auth-keys than others (typically those closer to clusters) do* because they are usually the hot spots and have to serve more clusters[14].

For example, in Fig. 1, serves two clusters and serves only one, so has to store more auth-keys[15]. Second, *the false reports are mainly filtered by the nodes closer to clusters, while most nodes closer to the base station have no chance to use the auth-keys they stored for filtering*. If we could let the nodes closer to clusters hold more auth-keys, the false reports can be dropped earlier. Therefore, to balance the memory requirement of nodes and provide a higher filtering capacity, we propose *Hill Climbing* approach, which achieves that the nodes closer to clusters hold more auth-keys than those closer to the base station do.[16] *Hill Climbing* involves two variations, one for the key pre distribution phase and the other for the key dissemination phase.

Report Forwarding Phase

In this phase, sensing nodes generate sensing reports in rounds.[17] Each round contains a fixed number of reports, e.g., 10 reports, where this number is predetermined before nodes are deployed. In each round, every sensing node chooses a new auth-key, i.e., the node's current auth-key, to authenticate its reports.[18]

In each round, the cluster-head generates the aggregated reports and forwards them to next hop, i.e., one of its selected downstream forwarding nodes. Then, it discloses the sensing nodes' auth-keys after overhearing the broadcast from the next-hop node.[19] The reports are forwarded hop-by hop to the base station. At every hop, a forwarding node verifies the validity of reports using the disclosed keys and informs its own next-hop node the verification result. The same procedure is repeated at each forwarding node until the reports are dropped or delivered to the base station[20].

IV. SIMULATION EVALUATION.

Simulation Setup

• Nodes are randomly deployed into a m square field with the base station located at the center. The transmission range of each node is m. These nodes are divided into 100 clusters, where each cluster contains exactly nodes.[21]
• Each node picks -keys and one -key, where the size of –key pool and – key pool .
• The size of memory used by each node is denoted as and measured by the number of keys that each node stores. Typically, . In our simulation, each cluster-head disseminates auth-keys to forwarding nodes. One node may need to store the auth-keys from different clusters. It divides its memory into equal-sized slots and assigns one slot to each cluster that it serves.[22]
• Each node forwards to selected downstream neighbor nodes, until reaches the base station or has been forwarded hops.
• Each aggregated report contains MACs, and there are at most compromised nodes in each cluster. The compromised nodes from the same cluster collaborate with each other to share the compromised secret keys.
• To simulate the dynamic topology, we apply a simple ON/OFF operation model, where each node switches its state between ON and OFF periodically. The duration of ON and OFF states satisfies an exponential distribution[23]. We define the percentage of OFF time as *network churn rate*, which indicates the extend of topology changing.[24]
• The routing protocol adopted in our simulation is GPSR. However, IHA and CCEF are not suitable for GPSR because they both require the existence of a fixed path between each cluster-head and the base station for transmitting control messages in both directions.[25] To make them work on top of GPSR, we revise them accordingly and design

ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

V. SIMULATION RESULTS

In summary, simulation results show that our scheme has the following advantages when compared with others:
1) Our scheme drops false reports earlier even with a lower memory requirement. In some scenario, it can drop false reports in 6 hops with only 25 keys stored in each node, but another scheme needs 12 hops even with 50 keys stored.[26]
2) Our scheme can better deal with the dynamic topology of sensor networks. It achieves a higher filtering capacity and filters out more false reports than others in dynamic network.[27]
3) *Hill Climbing* increases the filtering capacity of our scheme greatly and balances the memory requirement among sensor nodes.



.



VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Dynamic en-route quarantine scheme to filtering false data injection attacks and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. In our scheme, each node uses its own auth-keys to authenticate their reports and a legitimate report should be endorsed by nodes. The auth-keys of each node form a hash chain and are updated in each round. The cluster-head disseminates the first auth-key of every node to forwarding nodes and then sends the reports followed by disclosed auth-keys. The forwarding nodes verify the authenticity of the disclosed keys by hashing the disseminated keys and then check the integrity and validity of the reports using the disclosed keys. According to the verification results, they inform the next-hop nodes to either drop or keep on forwarding the reports. This process is repeated by each forwarding node at every hop.

Advantages:

1) Compared with others, our scheme can drop false reports much earlier even with a smaller size of memory.

ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

2) The uncompromised nodes will not be impersonated because each node has its own auth-keys. Therefore, once the compromised nodes are detected,
the infected clusters can be easily quarantined.

3) Our *Hill Climbing* key dissemination approach increases filtering capacity greatly and balances the memory requirement among nodes.

4) Each node has multiple downstream nodes that possess the necessary key information and are capable of filtering false reports. This not only makes our scheme adaptive to highly dynamic networks, but also mitigates the impact of selective forwarding attacks. 5) Monitored by its upstream nodes and neighbors, the compromised nodes have no way to contaminate legitimate reports or generate false control messages.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We wish to express our sincere thanks to all the staff member of C.S.E Department, GKM College of Engineering for their help and cooperation.

REFERENCES

[1] D. Braginsky and D. Estrin, "Rumor routing algorithm for sensor networks," in Proc. WSNA, 2002, pp. 22–31.
[2] N. Bulusu, J. Heidemann, and D. Estrin, "GPS-less low cost outdoor localization for very small devices," IEEE Personal Commun. Mag., vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 28–34, Oct. 2000.
[3] Kaliyamurthie K.P., Parameswari D., Udayakumar R., "QOS aware privacy preserving location monitoring in wireless sensor network", Indian Journal of Science and Technology, ISSN : 0974-6846, 6(S5) (2013) pp.4648-4652.
[4] S. Capkun and J. Hubaux, "Secure positioning of wireless devices with application to sensor networks," in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2005, vol. 3, pp. 1917–1928.
[5] L. Eschenauer and V. Gligor, "A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks," in Proc. ACM CCS, 2002, pp. 41–47.
[6] Sharmila D., Muthusamy P., "Removal of heavy metal from industrial effluent using bio adsorbents (Camellia sinensis)", Journal of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Research, ISSN : 0975 – 7384, 5(2) (2013) pp.10-13.
[7] T. He, C. Huang, B. Blum, J. Stankovic, and T. Abdelzaher, "Rangefree localization schemes in large scale sensor network," in Proc. ACM MobiCom, 2003, pp. 81–95.
[8] C. karlof and D.Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: Attacks and countermeasures," in Proc. 1st IEEE Int.Workshop Sensor Netw. Protocols Appl., 2003, pp. 113–127.
[9] Udayakumar R., Khanaa V., Saravanan T., Saritha G., "Retinal image analysis using curvelet transform and multistructure elements morphology by reconstruction", Middle - East Journal of Scientific Research, ISSN : 1990-9233, 16(12) (2013) pp.1781-1785.
[10] B. Karp and H. T. Kung, "GPSR: Greedy perimeter stateless routing for wireless networks," in Proc. ACM MobiCom, 2000, pp. 243–254.
[11] L. Lazos and R. Poovendran, "SeRLoc: Secure range independent localization forWireless sensor networks," in Proc. ACMWiSe, 2004, pp. 21–30.
[12] L. Lazos, R. Poovendran, and S. Capkun, "ROPE: Robust position estimation in wireless sensor networks," in Proc. IPSN, 2005, pp. 324–331.
[13] Kalaiselvi V.S., Prabhu K., Ramesh M., Venkatesan V., "The association of serum osteocalcin with the bone mineral density in post menopausal women",Journal of Clinical and Diagnostic Research, ISSN : 0973 - 709X, 7(5) (2013) pp.814-816.
[14] D. Liu and P. Ning, "Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks," in Proc. ACM CCS, 2003, pp. 52–56.
[15] R. Nagpal, H. Shrobe, and J. Bachrach, "Organizing a global coordinate system from local information on an ad hoc sensor network," in Proc. IPSN, 2003, LNCS 2634, pp. 333 348.
[16] D. Nicolescu and B. Nath, "Ad-hoc positioning systems (APS)," in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2001, vol. 5, pp. 2926 2931.
[17] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culer, and J. Tygar, "SPINS: Security protocols for sensor networks," in Proc. ACM MobiCom, 2001, pp. 189–199.
[18] B. Przydatek, D. Song, and A. Perrig, "SIA: Secure information aggregation in sensor networks," in Proc. ACM SenSys, 2003, pp. 255–265.
[19] K. Ren, W. Lou, and Y. Zhang, "LEDS: Providing location-aware end-to-end data security in wireless sensor networks," in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[20] "TinyOS community forum," [Online]. Available: http://www.tinyos.net
[21] A.Woo, T. Tong, and D. Culler, "Taming the underlying challenges of reliable multihop routing in sensor networks," in Proc. ACM SenSys, 2003, pp. 14–27.
[22] H. Yang and S. Lu, "Commutative cipher based en-route filtering in wireless sensor networks," in Proc. IEEE VTC, 2004, vol. 2, pp. 1223–1227.
[23]Jayalakshmi T., Krishnamoorthy P., Kumar G.R., Sivamani P., "The microbiological quality of fruit containing soft drinks from Chennai", Journal of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Research, ISSN : 0975 – 7384, 3(6) (2011) pp. 626-630.
[24] H. Yang, F. Ye, Y. Yuan, S. Lu, and W. Arbaugh, "Toward resilient security in wireless sensor networks," in Proc. ACM MobiHoc, 2005, pp. 34–45.
[25] F. Ye, H. Luo, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, "Statistical en-route detection and filtering of injected false data in sensor networks," in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2004, vol. 4, pp. 2446 2457.

ISSN(Online) :2319-8753
ISSN (Print) : 2347-6710

International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology

(An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization)

Vol. 4, Issue 9, September 2015

[26] Y. Yu, R. Govindan, and D. Estrin, "Geographical and energy aware routing: A recursive data dissemination protocol for wireless sensor networks," Comput. Sci. Dept., Univ. California, Los Angeles, UCLA-CSD TR-01–0023, 2001.
[27] Z. Yu and Y. Guan, "A dynamic en-route scheme for filtering false data injection in wireless sensor networks," in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[28]P.JENNIFER, DR. A. MUTHU KUMARAVEL, Comparative Analysis of advanced Face Recognition Techniques, International Journal of Innovative Research in Computer and Communication Engineering, ISSN(Online): 2320-9801, pp 4917-4923 Vol. 2, Issue 7, July 2014
[29] Dr.R.Udayakumar, Computer Simulation of Polyamidoamine Dendrimers and Their Complexes with Cisplatin Molecules in Water Environment, International Journal of Innovative Research in Computer and Communication, ISSN(Online): 2320-9801,pp 3729,25-30, Vol. 2, Issue 4, April 2014
[30]. DR.A.Muthu kumaravel, Mr. Kannan Subramanian, Collaborative Filtering Based On Search Engine Logs, International Journal of Innovative Research in Computerand Communication Engineering, ISSN(Online): 2320-9801,pp 2432-2436, Vol. 2, Issue 1, January 2014
[31] Dr.A.Muthu Kumaravel, Mining User Profile Using Clustering FromSearch Engine Logs, International Journal of Innovative Research in Computerand Communication Engineering, ISSN(Online): 2320-9801,pp 4774-4778, Vol. 2, Issue 6, June 2014
[32]. P.Kavitha, Web Data High Quality Search - No User Profiling, International Journal of Innovative Research in Computerand Communication Engineering, ISSN(Online):2320-9801,pp 2025-2030, Volume 1, Issue 9, November 2013